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EMPLOYING THE SECTION 5 ENFORCEMENT
POWER TO GUARANTEE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN THE STATE COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A local bishop is concerned that a minister in her bishopric is
mentally unsound. The codes and canons of her ecclesiastic body charge
the bishop with the duty to see to the mental fitness of her ministers. In
an effort to determine whether her minister is in a state that might
jeopardize the spiritual well-being of her flock, the bishop contacts the
psychologist treating the minister, and using moral persuasion, obtains
information relating to the therapy the minister is receiving. Based on
this information, the bishop decides to relieve the minister of his duties.'
A claim is brought by the divested minister against the bishop for
failing to reappoint him as a minister, claiming lost wages and earning
capacity.2 May the bishop be held liable for conduct in accordance with
the ecclesiastic rules of her church? May a state court inquire into the
propriety of a bishop's conduct concerning the administration of her
bishopric and its ministers? It depends at what time in history the
question is posed. Fifty years ago, the answer would have almost
certainly been that the principle of separation of church and state,3 that
steadfast and enduring derivative of the Establishment Clause4 and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
1. The facts in this example are borrowed from the case Alberts v. Donald, 479 N.E.2d
113,115 (Mass. 1985).
2. Id. at 120.
3. This principle often manifests itself under the doctrine of religious or ecclesiastic
questions. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of
Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219,220 (2000).
[T]he First Amendment religious clauses ... contain... restriction[s] on the capacity
of government, and especially the judiciary, to involve itself in matters of religious
truth and doctrine, potentially irrespective of the conduct at issue and the identities
of the parties. Broadly conceptualized, this restriction amounts to a general
prohibition on the adjudication of religious questions, not unlike the Article Ill
prohibition on the adjudication of so-called political or nonjusticiable questions.
Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... ).
5. Id. ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]....").
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Constitution, would have decreed that state courts eschew involvement
in such ecclesiastic quarrels.6 Historically, abstention from hearing such
claims did not stem from a belief that the minister's claim was without
normative merit; rather, it was instinctively recognized by secular jurists
that even the most erudite of that rank would be reduced to a mere
neophyte once asked to expound upon the dictates of the ecclesiastic
doctrine.7
Recently, however, both scholars' and judges9 have become
increasingly confident in the latter's ability to assume the role of arbiter
between divided flocks and dueling shepherds. More and more state
courts are entertaining causes of action in tort against ecclesiastic
bodies,'0 and the academic and judicial temper towards these new modes
of redress do not suggest that such actions are on the decline." This
growing trend of litigious vindication for civil harms allegedly inflicted
6. See Maxwell v. Brougher, 222 P.2d 910, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (stating that
"[w]here... a matter which concerns church discipline or the conformity of its members to
the standard of morals required of them, the decision of the church tribunal will not be
interfered with by the secular courts ... by directing them to proceed in a certain
manner... ").
7. Saunders-El v. Tsoulos, 1 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848 (N.D. Ill. 1998) ("[C]ourts are not
equipped to resolve intra-faith differences among followers of a particular creed in relation to
the Religion Clauses.").
8. See Eduardo Cruz, Comment, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock: Clergy Sexual
Exploitation and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 499 (1991); Ivy B. Dodes,
Note, "Suffer The Little Children.. .": Toward a Judicial Recognition of a Duty of Reasonable
Care Owed Children by Religious Faith Healers, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 165 (1987); Randall K.
Hanson, Clergy Malpractice: Suing Ministers, Pastors, and Priests for Ungodly Counseling, 39
DRAKE L. REV. 597 (1990); Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for
Sexual Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
9. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979) (holding that a state may constitutionally
adopt neutral principles of law to adjudicate church property disputes); Maktab Tarighe
Oveyssi Shah Maghsoudi, Inc. v. Kianfar, 179 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"no First Amendment issue arises when a court resolves a church property dispute by relying
on state statutes concerning the holding of religious property, the language in the relevant
deeds, and the terms of corporate charters of religious organizations"); Martinelli v.
Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 148 (D. Conn. 1998)
(holding that a fiduciary claim against a diocese may be resolved under Connecticut law using
neutral principles).
10. See EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505 (E.D.N.C 1999); Schmoll
v. Chapman Univ., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d
450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985); H.R.B. v. J.L.G.,
913 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Ran-Day's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353
(N.J. 1992); Lightman v. Flaum, 687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); Martinez v. Primera
Asemblea de Dios, Inc., No. 05-96-01458-CV, 1998 WL 242412 (Tex. Ct. App. May 15, 1998);
C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop, 985 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1999).
11. See generally supra note 8.
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from the pulpit might be attributed to several factors. First, citizens
increasingly look to courts to remedy legal and social harms, of which
religious organizations are not incapable of rendering.2 Second, the
wealth and property holdings of religious organizations in the United
States are at their zenith 3--and wealth and property rarely fail to attract
legal attention." Third, and perhaps most important, an increasingly
secular society inclined to render all things relative no longer recognizes
a meaningful distinction between the affairs of the church and the affairs
of other prominent, and civilly liable, organizations and entities."5
Whatever the reasons, this disturbing erosion of ecclesiastic
autonomy is at odds with the basic tenets of the First Amendment." It is
also at odds with notions of sound and farsighted government.' The
12. See, e.g., John H. Arnold, Clergy Sexual Malpractice, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 25
(1996).
13. See, e.g., William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious
Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 317 (1986) (noting that
"[t]he financial growth and commercial expansion of churches provide a fertile source of
regulatory conflict.").
14. John C. Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly
Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 679 (1998) (noting that plaintiffs pursue defendants with deep
pockets "even though [they are] only tangentially involved, because it increases the likelihood
of recovering damages"); Villiers, supra note 8, at 28 (noting "the church is a deep pocket").
15. Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Comment, Having One's Cake and Eating it Too:
Government Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and
Universities, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1061,1062.
The reason the proper relation between church and state is hard to capture in one
image is because religious groups and religious individuals are not autonomous and
isolated entities that exist on the other side of a wall from secular society; rather,
they exist in the midst of secular society. Religious groups have contact with other
groups, both religious and secular. They use the property and resources of society.
In addition, religious groups provide some of the same social services government
does-such as education, health care, housing, and social welfare. Furthermore,
religious groups often employ or provide services to individuals who are not
members of the group. Thus, religion and government cannot avoid each other.
Their interests and obligations intersect. But, where interests intersect, they can also
collide.
Id.
16. See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religious Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373,
1373 (1981) (noting that "the right of church autonomy" is one of the rights protected by the
Free Exercise Clause that "tends to be overlooked").
17. See John Morton Cummings, Jr., Comment, The State, the Stork and the Wal" The
Establishment Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1194-95
(1990). The Comment discusses the advocacy for religious freedom and separation of church
and state by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.
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specter of the federal government intermingling in religious affairs of its
citizens was promptly and prudently arrested by the nascent Congress in
1791 with the passage of the Bill of Rights, which placed the grant of
religious freedom first among those august provisions.8 A century and a
half later, through the concept of due process, the First Amendment was
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable
to the states. 9 Today, the protection of religious freedom once again
requires the attention and vigilance of Congress, and thankfully,
Congress is not without remedy.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
enforce the protections of the First Amendment against the states.2'
Using this enforcement power, Congress may authorize the federal
[James] Madison... cautioned against political involvement in... religious issues
'because it [would] destroy that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of
our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects.
Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular
arm to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious
opinions' ... Madison was [also] victorious.., in convincing the Framers of the
Constitution to include protection of religious freedoms in the Bill of Rights.
Id. (citations omitted). The Comment also notes:
[Thomas] Jefferson felt so strongly about the separation of church and state that he
had the passage of the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty listed on his tombstone
as one of his greatest accomplishments.... Jefferson's vision of the first amendment
still persists today: 'A wall of separation between church and State.'
Id. (citations omitted); see also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 299-
301 (Anchor Books ed., 1969) (noting that the separation of church and state is essential to
preserve religion in America).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.") (emphasis added).
19. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (incorporating the Free
Exercise Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
18 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Id.
21. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("We agree.., of course, that
Congress can enact legislation under § 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise
of religion.").
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judiciary to enjoin state courts that seek to adjudicate matters which (1)
excessively entangle church and state, (2) have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) regulate religious rather than
secular conduct.n
This Comment lays out the scope of the constitutional violations
committed by the adjudication of torts against ecclesiastic bodies by
state courts, and it proposes the remedy by which Congress might halt
such encroachment by the state courts. Specifically, Part II diagrams the
offenses inflicted upon the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment arising from the engagement of
religious conduct by secular state courts. Part III discusses the remedy
that Congress may issue under its Section 5 power to grant injunctive
relief to religious defendants. Part IV anticipates and addresses possible
constitutional and statutory attacks brought against this injunctive
remedy. Finally, Part V concludes that such a remedy is a prudent and
appropriate means by which Congress may halt existing unconstitutional
practices by state courts that hinder religious freedoms. Part V thus
urges enactment of the proposed statute.
II. STATE COURT ADJUDICATIONS OF TORTS AGAINST ECCLESIASTIC
BODIES ARE OCCURRING IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Protections of the Establishment Clause: The Lemon Test
Under Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the United States Supreme Court
outlined the three evils that the Establishment Clause is interpreted to
prevent.' The first evil to be prevented is state action that lacks a
secular purpose.' The second evil to be prevented is state action that
has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.' The third
evil to be prevented is state action that is excessively entangled with
22. These are the three prohibitions of government conduct under the so-called "Lemon
test" in reference to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Kurt T. Lash, Speech, The
Status of Constitutional Religious Liberty at the End of the Millenium, 32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1,
5 (1998) (summarizing the Lemon test: "Government actions must have a secular purpose;
they cannot have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and government
regulation must not excessively entangle church and state.").
23. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
24. Id. at 612 ("In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must
draw lines with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the





religion.2V Entanglement can result from administrative oversight,
political entanglement, vesting religious individuals with governmental
authority, or regulatory conduct by the state that advances or inhibits
religion."
These three tests serve as gauges whereby the Court can ascertain
whether the state actions, taken as a whole, amount to an endorsement,
or display a preference for one religion over another, or one set of
religious beliefs and practices over another.29 These gauges can be very
sensitive. For example, a court may consider a judicial inquiry into a
religious matter unconstitutional merely because it might have a
"chilling effect" on an institution's sacerdotal practices.' Similarly, a
court may consider a statute affecting a religious institution
unconstitutional merely because it sets the stage for future litigation
concerning what is or what is not religious.3 In fact, courts have
declared that a religious institution's right to be free from the legal
probing and rancor of secular court affairs is at "the very core" of the
constitutional guarantees for religious establishments.32
Although not all courts agree, the Establishment Clause is generally
held to prohibit courts from reviewing a religious institution's decision
to hire or terminate a minister.33 In Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (holding that the main factor
is whether the legislation "constitutes an endorsement of one or another set of religious
beliefs or of religion generally").
30. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780,791 (Wis. 1995) (holding that
determining whether ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised a defendant bishop
would have chilling effect on "future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a result
violative of the text and history of the establishment clause") (citations omitted).
31. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977) (declaring that the "prospect
of church and state litigating in court about what does and does not have religious meaning
touches the very core of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment, and it
cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only once").
32. Id.; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717-18 (1976)
(holding "questions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at
the core of ecclesiastic concern" and a review of such firing practices is "impermissible under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments").
33. Dausch v. Ryske, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246,
1249 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that inquiries into "policies and practices of [churches in] ...
hiring or supervising their clergy" violate the First Amendment) (citation omitted); Schmidt
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App.
1994); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997); Gibson v. Brewer, 952
S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (stating that nonrecognition of the cause of negligent
supervision of a clergy member preserves autonomy and freedom of religious institution);
L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997); Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 782 (holding that the
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Milwaukee,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that judicial
inquiries into the realm of Church "policies and practices" for hiring and
supervising clergy raise First Amendment "entanglement" problems in
violation of the Establishment Clause.35 Further, in Van Osdol v. Vogt,
36
the Colorado Supreme Court held that "judicial review" of church
practices in hiring ministers "excessively entangles" church and state in
violation of the Establishment Clause.' The Van Osdol court reasoned
that personnel matters, when they pertain to ministers, are
"inextricable" from matters relating to church doctrine.
The Establishment Clause also limits excessive government
encroachment into religious affairs in areas of secular administration.
In Waltz v. Tax Commission,4° the United States Supreme Court held
that the Establishment Clause prohibits "sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement" of the state in the realm of religious activity.41
While the Waltz court acknowledged that it is inevitable that at some
level government finds itself intermingled with religious organizations,
the Court regarded any excessive entanglement on the part of
government in the affairs of religion proscribed by the Constitution.42
Finally, the Establishment Clause restricts states and local
governments from enacting ordinances regulating matters of a religious
nature such as religious food preparation. 4  For example, laws
regulating kosher food have been held to violate the Establishment
Clause because they regulate "religious purity" rather than the sanitary
First Amendment bars a claim of negligent hiring, retaining, supervision, and training against
religious institutions). But see Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 323 (Colo. 1993)
(holding that a member of the clergy who "accepts the parishioner's trust and accepts the role
of counselor" has a duty to act "with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the parishioner")
(citation omitted); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Konkle v. Henson, 672
N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Byrd
v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App.
1989).
34. 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995).
35. Id. at 791 (citation omitted).
36. 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1996).
37. Id. at 1132-33.
38. Id. at 1128.
39. See Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 668.
42. Id. at 674.
43. Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 1353, 1366 (N.J. 1992)
(holding that kosher regulations "involve the State excessively in religious matters").
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or nutritional quality of food." Moreover, such regulations generate
unconstitutional, if not awkward, confrontations between religious
adherents who insist that their food is, for example, kosher, but are
nonetheless prosecuted under state or municipal regulations because the
secular agencies believe, as a matter of law, that the food does not
conform to the requirements of Orthodox Judaism. 5
In general, courts are still highly cognizant of the need to avoid
entanglements between church and government that tread on the
establishment of religion. However, as will be apparent by later
discussions in this Comment, some state courts are becoming less rigid
in their demands for a disconnection of church and state.
B. Protections of the Free Exercise Clause: The Smith Test
Unlike the relatively invariant jurisprudence of the Establishment
Clause,46 the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has recurrently
changed over the last half century. Prior to the 1960s, a government
action did not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it was in pursuit of
non-religious ends, and if the purpose of the action was to regulate
secular conduct rather than religious belief However, after the early
1960s the United States Supreme Court began to view laws that
burdened the free exercise of religion as matters for heightened
scrutiny, even if the laws affecting religious exercise were neutral in
intent and application.'
In Sherbert v. Verner4 9 the Court held that an employment law which
forced a Seventh Day Adventist to choose between working on
Saturdays or honoring the Saturday Sabbath requirements of her
religion placed a burden on the free exercise of religion and was
discriminatory in its application.-" The Court held that in order to
uphold the employment law, the state must show it had a compelling
interest justifying a Saturday work policy that did not accommodate
44. Id. at 1360.
45. Id.
46. See supra Part II.A.
47. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (holding that bigamy was
validly prohibited by the state over Free Exercise objections because states were able to
regulate conduct in violation of "social duties").
48. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. Id. at 406.
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those who worshiped on Saturdays-which the state was unable to do. 1
Similarly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the Court held that the State of
Wisconsin could not compel Amish children to attend high schoolY5'
Applying a strict scrutiny standard, the Court found that the state's
interest in educating all of its citizens was not a sufficient reason to
interfere with the Amish religious belief that children be taught
vocational skills at home.' Thus, the SherbertlYoder cases and their
progeny assembled a regime of strict scrutiny protection for religious
actors under the Free Exercise Clause for almost thirty years.
In 1990, however, the Court abruptly departed from the scheme laid
out in the SherbertlYoder line of cases in its holding in Employment
Division v. Smith.5 Under Smith, the Court held that neutral
government action, which is not directed at a religious practice, and
generally applicable, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it
survives a rational basis test." Smith involved American Indians fired
by their employers for using the hallucinogenic drug peyote during a
religious ceremonyY The American Indians claimed that denial of
unemployment benefits by the State of Oregon interfered with their
First Amendment right to use the hallucinogen during the ceremonies."
Employing reductio ad adsurdum'9 the court backed away from its
earlier pronouncements in SherberlYoder and reeled in its strict scrutiny
treatment of government action hindering the free exercise of religion.:°
Instead, the Court-adopted a rational basis standard when reviewing
neutral laws of general applicability.61 The Court reasoned that "the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes . . . conduct that his religion
51. Id. at 409.
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Id. at 207.
54. Id. at 224-25.
55. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
56. Id. at 885.
57. Id. at 874.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)) (asking
"'Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."').
60. Id.




In the wake of Smith, it was not clear whether the neutral laws of
general applicability would apply to the practices and policies of
religious institutions.63 Under a regime where laws of neutral and
general applicability are enforced, the pre-Smith legal protections?
under the "church autonomy doctrine ' or the "ministerial exception '
protecting the prerogatives of ecclesiastic bodies to conduct their own
affairs free from secular law might arguably be breached.67 It appears,
however, that the church autonomy doctrine has survived Smith because
of its dual guardianship under both the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause.
68
At least for now, courts continue to hold that the church autonomy
doctrine survived Smith.69 Under the surviving church autonomy
doctrine, Title VII and certain intentional tort claims in the church
employment realm are still barred under the Free Exercise Clause since
such claims are thought to require nonjusticiable evaluations of
62. Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
63. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Towards
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1009 (1990) (sarcastically noting that as a result of the
Smith decision "churches cannot be taxed or regulated any more heavily than General
Motors. The only remaining protection is that provided by formal neutrality; religious
conduct cannot be singled out for facially discriminatory regulation."); Steven D. Smith, The
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 237
(1991) (stating that Smith signaled a "withdrawal of constitutional protection for the free
exercise of religion").
64. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that Title VII
enforcement against religious institutions would encroach on religious freedom).
65. Laycock, supra note 16, at 1388-1402.
66. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (defining the
"ministerial exception" as a "long held" practice of precluding civil courts from "adjudicating
employment discrimination suits by ministers against the church or religious institution
employing them"). The court further notes that the exception is applied also to lay
employees of religious institutions "whose 'primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the
faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship...."' Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also
Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church." Denying Court Access to
Ministerial Employees, 74 IND. LJ. 269, 269 (1998) (explaining that under the ministerial
exception "courts have consistently held that the application of anti-discrimination laws to
religious organizations and their ministerial employees would prove a violation of the First
Amendment").
67. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 463 (stating that "the application of Title VII would violate
the Free Exercise Clause" and that the ministerial exception "survives under an exception to
the general rule in Smith"). But see Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 42 F. Supp. 2d
849, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (applying the ministerial exception narrowly).
69. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 463; Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1131 (Colo. 1996).
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ecclesiastic matters.70 Explaining how the Free Exercise Clause still
protects church autonomy, the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit in EEOC v. Catholic University7' delineated a Free Exercise
Clause with two strands, one of which Smith did not affect.72 The first
strand addressed the Free Exercise Clause's protection of the
individual's right to practice his or her faith.' The second addressed
protection against government encroachment into the internal
management of a church.74 The latter, according to the court, was
unaffected by the Smith decision. 7 Whether the ministerial exception in
the post-Smith regime is bulwarked by the Establishment Clause7' or the
Free Exercise Clause is beyond the scope of this Comment; it is
sufficient for the present to merely note that courts continue to
recognize that a church remains free to select and administer to those
persons who "will carry out its religious mission."'
Although some free exercise protections, such as the ministerial
exception, continue to survive under the post-Smith regime, the fate of
religious protections as a whole in the state courts is uncertain. As the
next section illustrates, state courts employ a variety of techniques-
most of which are inconsistent with the mandates of the First
Amendment-to allow once-proscribed tort claims against ecclesiastic
bodies to be adjudicated.
C. Courts are Split on the Interpretation of Protections Afforded by Both
Religious Clauses of the First Amendment
1. The Application of "Neutral Principles of Law"' s to Allow State
Encroachment into Religious Affairs in Violation of the First
Amendment
The First Amendment provides that interpretation of church law,
70. Van Osdol, 908 P.2d at 1128.
71. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 455.




76. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976); Van Osdol v.
Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122,1131 (Colo. 1996).
77. See Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 462 (stating that courts are unable to determine if an
employment decision is based on legitimate or illegitimate grounds without delving into the
internal management of the church-which is impermissible).
78. Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286,288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
2002] 1035
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
policies, or practices by a court excessively entangles government with
religion in violation of the First Amendment.9 However, tort actions
against religious institutions are not offensive to the First Amendment if
the commission of the tort is based on purely secular activities, outside
the tenets of religion.'o When the conduct associated with the tort is
nonreligious, a court may then adjudicate the action by applying
"neutral principles of law" that do not require the court to interpret
church law, policies, or practices."1 Such neutral principles of law are
regularly applied in property and trust cases, where either a religious
institution is a party to the case, or a property or trust dispute exists
between two or more religious institutions.' While there is general
agreement that certain cases can be litigated without the interpretation
of religious canons and practices through the application of neutral
principles of law, state courts are increasingly split as to how far the
application of neutral principles may extend without excessive
entanglement by the state courts in violation of the First Amendment.83
To apply neutral principles of law, a court must be convinced that
the legal issue does not involve religious conduct." However,
determinations by state courts that conduct is secular and not religious
are not always convincing, and the use of neutral principles often raises
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
80. See H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
81. Evans, 718 So. 2d at 286.
82. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (holding that religious disputes may, in certain
circumstances, be resolved without entangling government with religion by invoking neutral
principles of law that rely on objective, well-established concepts of law familiar to lawyers
and judges, such as those in trust or property law. The application of neutral principles of law
permits a court to interpret provisions of religious documents involving nondoctrinal matters
as long as the analysis can be done in purely secular terms.).
83. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246,
1249 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that inquiries into "policies and practices of the [church] ...
hiring or supervising their clergy" violate the First Amendment) (citation omitted); Schmidt
v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206 (La. Ct. App.
1994); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997); Gibson v. Brewer, 952
S.W.2d 239, 248 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (stating that nonrecognition of the cause of negligent
supervision of a clergy member preserves autonomy and freedom of religious institution);
L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533
N.W.2d 780, 782 (Wis. 1995) (holding that the First Amendment bars claims for negligent
hiring, retaining, supervision, and training against religious institutions). But see Destefano v.
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993);
Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Erickson v. Christenson, 781
P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
84. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (stating that neutral principles of law may
be applied when there is "no issue of doctrinal controversy ... involved").
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the question of whether courts first determine whether they want to
adjudicate the case, and then resolve the issue of whether the conduct
was religious to conform to a desired outcome.85 Such exercises in
semantics and sophistry allow courts to do "end-runs" around the First
Amendment that lead to extraordinary and irreconcilable results.
In Lightman v. Flaum,8 the New York Supreme Court held that a
cause of action for alleged breach of the clergy-penitent privilege by a
Jewish rabbi was allowable because the actions of the rabbi were
"secular in nature" rather than religious." The court declared that the
defendant's duty to keep private certain religious conversations was not
his "religious obligation as a Rabbi" and that there was no "justification,
religious or otherwise" under Talmudic law for the Rabbi to breach his
privilege." How the Rabbi's ministerial obligations to members of his
temple were not religious is unclear." How the New York court was
able to constitutionally make the religious duties of a rabbi to his
congregates a requirement of law is even less clear. On the other hand,
how the New York court purported to have power to hear the case is
very clear: It declared the rabbi's conduct to be secular and proceeded
to apply neutral principles of law to adjudicate the matter.9 The court's
holding in Flaum cannot be reconciled with the First Amendment
prohibition against interpreting the tenets of religious doctrine by a
court. Nonetheless, the court adjudicated the rightfulness or
85. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 259.
Because the First Amendment obstacles to adjudicating tort claims against religious
defendants cannot in principle be ignored outright, courts seeking to overcome these
obstacles must rely upon or develop various exceptions to the First Amendment's
applications.... The most widely invoked exception [to the First Amendment's
application] involves the . . . neutral principles method, which allows the
adjudication of religious institutional disputes when they can be resolved according
to "neutral principles of law," that is, legal rules or standards that have been
developed and are regularly applied in a given field of law without particular regard
to religious institutions or doctrines.
Id. (citation omitted); Harrison Sheppard, American Principles and the Evolving Ethos of
American Legal Practice, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 237,250 (1996).
86. 687 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
87. Id. at 568.
88. Id. at 570.
89. Id. at 765-71.
90. Id. at 569 (The judge's personal outrage with respect to the rabbi's conduct is
expressed in the opinion: "In my view, this was not only improper, it was outrageous and most
offensive, especially considering the stature of these defendants within the community....
[N]o member of the clergy... would dare breach the sanctity of his or her office to make
public the type of confidential, private disclosures at issue in this case.").
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wrongfulness of a Jewish rabbi's behavior under Talmudic law-a
determination that a secular judge has neither the religious training, nor
the constitutional authority, to make. The court's holding in Flaum is a
troubling, albeit instructive, example of recent departures from the
traditional abstention by state courts from interpreting the tenets of
religious doctrine when adjudicating religious torts.
2. State Courts Must Interpret and Apply the First Amendment in a
Uniform Manner
Although courts are free to employ neutral principles of law where
applicable, the Constitution cannot abide too much disuniformity across
states relating to adjudications involving the First Amendment. From
early on in American history, a uniform interpretation of the
Constitution has been held to be of paramount importance in protecting
the constitutional rights of all United States citizens.' Under this legal
principle, the Constitution's protections do not vary from state to state,
and its protections should be uniformly interpreted and applied.?
Where conflicting interpretations of the Constitution arise, violations
inevitably follow. Logic instructs that where there are two contrary
interpretations of a single Constitution, only one interpretation can be
correct. Consequently, the other interpretation is unconstitutional and
incorrect. Therefore, state court opinions that contradict one another
when interpreting the First Amendment of the Constitution raise
colorable questions concerning the constitutionality of each and every
opinion.
In recent years, state courts have unquestionably split on the issue of
whether the First Amendment allows a right of action against
ecclesiastic institutions for negligent supervision of ministers93 and
91. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
92. See Drummond v. Fulton County, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
93. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993) (holding that
although a court must not become embroiled in interpreting or weighing a church doctrine, a
claim of negligent hiring of a minister is actionable because it does not require such
interpretation or weighing of a religious belief but instead is merely an application of a
secular standard to secular conduct); see also Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928
P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996); Kenneth v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1997); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). But see Gibson v.
Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (holding that "judicial inquiry into hiring,
ordaining, and retaining clergy would result in an endorsement of religion, by approving one
model for church hiring, ordination, and retention of clergy") (citation omitted); Pritzlaff v.
Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780 (Wis. 1995).
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whether religious ministers can be sued for breach of fiduciary duties.94
Such splits are evidence that state courts are unconstitutionally
adjudicating matters relating to alleged tortious conduct on the part of
religious institutions. Confronted with colorable evidence that state
courts are violating the Constitution by adjudicating torts against
religious institutions, Congress may provide a means by which a uniform
interpretation of the Constitution is applied in state courts by exercising
its Section 5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment."
3. Courts are Split on Allowing Causes of Action for Negligent
Supervision of Ministers and Breach of Fiduciary Duties
a. Negligent Supervision
The tort of negligent supervision," for the hiring, supervision,
retention, and dismissal of religious employees, is allowed as a cause of
action in some courts, but not others. Courts allowing these actions
reason that the court is not inquiring into the employer's religious
reasons for choosing or retaining a particular employee, but is instead
focusing on the specific foreseeable dangers that ultimately result in
harm to others.' For example, in Bear Valley Church of Christ v.
DeBose the Colorado Supreme Court allowed a cause of action for
negligent hiring and supervision of a clergy member. The court
maintained that such inquiries, even when applied to ministers, are so
"limited and factually based that they can be accomplished with no
94. Moses, 863 P.2d 310; Erickson, 781 P.2d 383. But see Amato v. Greenquist, 679
N.E.2d 446 (Il1. App. Ct. 1997); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
95. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
96. Moses, 863 P.2d at 324 n.16 (stating that "the tort of negligent hiring addresses the
risk created by exposing members of the public to a potentially dangerous individual")
(citations omitted); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1322 (Colo. 1996)
(stating that "[a]n employer is found liable for negligent hiring if, at the time of hiring, the
employer had reason to believe that hiring this person would create an undue risk of harm to
others") (citation omitted); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Mo. 1997) (stating that to
prove a claim for negligent hiring or retention of a clergy member "a plaintiff must show: (1)
the employer knew or should have known of the employee's dangerous proclivities, and (2)
the employer's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries") (citation
omitted); Kenneth, 654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (defining negligent retention and supervision as torts
where an "employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the
conduct which caused the injury").
97. See supra note 96.
98. 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996).
99. Id. at 1325.
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inquiry into religious beliefs 100 and are instead mere routine
applications of standards of secular conduct.'0 ' Such decisions often
employ the following line of reasoning: States may regulate secular
conduct that is tortious.'O' Negligent hiring and supervision claims are
not based solely on religious matters,'O' and subsequently, religious
institutions may be held accountable for actions carried out as part of
their religious practice."
At the opposite end of the spectrum, some state courts continue to
hold that negligent hiring claims violate both the Establishment Clause
and Free Exercise Clause. These courts maintain that any adjudication
of negligent supervision would involve an interpretation of church
canon and internal church policies and practices.' 5 In Gibson v.
Brewer,"" the Missouri Supreme Court did not allow a cause of action
for negligent hiring on grounds that inquiry and examination into the
hiring policies of religious bodies inevitably requires judicial inquiry into
"religious doctrine," '' and involves excessive entanglement in church
operations on the part of the government.'m
To preserve the autonomy of religious bodies, these courts decline to
recognize the adjudication of torts that require an inquiry into the
reasonableness of ecclesiastic conduct, believing that such adjudications
would tread on First Amendment protections.'0 These courts reason
100. Id. at 1323.
101. Id.
102. Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993); see also Konkle v.
Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "[t]he First Amendment...
contains two freedoms[,] ... the freedom to believe and the freedom to act.... The freedom
to believe is absolute, while the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection of
society.") (citation omitted).
103. Moses, 863 P.2d at 320.
104. Kenneth v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 654 N.Y.2d 791,796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
105. See generally Isely v. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich. 1995)
(stating that inquiry into practices and policies of churches of hiring and supervising clergy
raises the same kind of First Amendment problems which might involve the court making
sensitive judgment about the propriety of judgments about the supervision in light of religious
beliefs); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
106. 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997).
107. Id. at 246.
108. Id. at 247 (holding that "[s]uch excessive entanglement between church and state
has the effect of inhibiting religion, in violation of the First Amendment"). Further,
adjudicating the reasonableness of a church's supervision of a cleric requires excessive
entanglement into religious doctrine. Id.
109. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 791 (Wis. 1995) (stating
that there is a general agreement that intentional torts of failure to supervise do not offend
the First Amendment because the right to free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
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that the Constitution demands that ecclesiastic institutions be free from
"secular control or manipulation" when deciding matters of church
governance.110 The courts contend that inquiries into the reasonableness
of religious conduct would result in "excessive entanglement in church
operations" manifested by a court approving one model for church
hiring or retention over another."' In Ayon v. Gourley,"' for example,
the Colorado District Court held that even general application of tort
law principles to church procedures on the choice of its clergy members
presents practices with an "intent to pass on their reasonableness."113 In
fact, even inquiries into the agency relationship between a bishop and a
priest have been held unconstitutional because they require
interpretation of religious law and usage."'
b. Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Another issue dividing courts is whether a clergy member may be
held liable for breach of fiduciary duties. s Generally, a fiduciary
relationship involves a relationship where one person has a duty to act
for the benefit of another.16  Recently, some courts have held that
ministers, by holding themselves out to perform services for church
members, such as counseling, owe those members fiduciary duties which
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability).
110. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 692 A.2d 441,443 (Me. 1997).
111. Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246,1250 (D. Colo. 1998).
112. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1246.
113. Id. at 1250 (stating that "the Court cannot agree... that ... such a claim would be
unlikely to cause excessive entanglement").
114. See Pritzlaff, 533 N.W.2d at 790.
115. Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that
[n]egligent hiring occurs when, prior to the time the employee is actually hired, the employer
knew or should have known of the employee's unfitness, and the issue of liability primarily
focuses upon the adequacy of the employer's pre-employment investigation into the
employee's background. Negligent retention... occurs when ... the employer becomes
aware or should have become aware ... [and takes no further action].").
116. See Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "a
fiduciary relationship is one founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the
integrity and fidelity of another") (citations omitted); Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d
310, 321 (Colo. 1993) (defining a fiduciary relationship as a "'relation... between two
persons when one of them is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another
upon matters within the scope of the relation'") (quoting the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 874
cmt. a (1979)); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that "a
fiduciary relationship is recognized to exist when 'a special confidence [is] reposed in one
who, by reason of such confidence, must act in good faith and with due regard to the interests
of the person reposing such confidence'" (quoting Estate of Osborn, 470 N.E.2d 1114, 1117
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984)).
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are illegal to breach. 117 In such cases, the courts apply a secular standard
of conduct to the minister, and adjudicate the matter by applying neutral
principles of law to what is deemed nonreligious (secular) conduct on
the part of the ministers."'
Other courts reject the notion that liability for breach of a fiduciary
duty can be imposed by a court through the use of neutral principles.
The rejection of the neutral principles approach is based on the belief
that such a determination would require a court to define the scope of
the fiduciary duty, and to define the standard of care to which a clergy
member of a particular faith must adhere, which would excessively
entangle the state with religion."9 These courts summarily reject the
notion that a legal duty can be imposed on an individual merely because
that individual is a member of an ecclesiastic body." ° These courts point
out that if a minister were instead a neighbor or co-worker or friend, no
secular law would hold him or her liable for breach of fiduciary duties."'
In Doe v. Dunbar," the Florida Court of Appeals held that the
creation of a tort for breach of a fiduciary duty which requires
adherence to a particular religious doctrine constitutes an establishment
of religion in violation of the religious clauses of the First
Amendment."3 Similarly, in Dausch v. Rykse,' 24 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that recognition of a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty premised upon the counseling
relationship between a cleric and church member would violate the First
Amendment."2' The court held that "to define a reasonable duty
standard and to evaluate [the cleric's] conduct against that standard...
117. Moses, 863 P.2d 310.
118. Id; see also F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 702 (NJ. 1997) (noting courts have
found that the First Amendment does not insulate a member of the clergy from actions for
breach of fiduciary duty arising out of sexual misconduct occurring during the course of
counseling a parishioner).
119. See MacDonell, 696 A.2d at 702 (suggesting that other causes of action are available
in cases of molestation that do not require the court to set a reasonableness standard for
clergy members-such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, et cetera.
Actions for fiduciary duties against religious institutions excessively entangle civil courts in
religious matters. Most courts do not agree that breach of fiduciary duty is a disguised
attempt at "clergy malpractice"-which no court has yet adjudicated.).
120. See id. at 706 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the court's allowance of a
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty).
121. See id.
122. 718 So. 2d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
123. Id.; see also MacDonell, 696 A.2d at 709.
124. 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
125. Id. at 1438.
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is [a judicial practice] of doubtful validity under the Free Exercise
Clause. "'
4. Court Splits Raise Colorable Questions as to Whether State Courts
are Unconstitutionally Adjudicating Torts Against Religious
Defendants
The disparity of state court adjudications of negligent supervision
and breach of fiduciary duties leave the constitutionality of such
proceedings as open questions. Faced with the reality that state courts
are arguably adjudicating torts against religious institutions
unconstitutionally,"z Congress is entitled to enact a remedy that
enforces the religious clauses of the First Amendment against the state
courts. Since the First Amendment applies to any action by a state
power including state courts,"' Congress is entitled to authorize the
federal courts to enjoin state courts from unconstitutionally adjudicating
torts against religious institutions under the Section 5 power of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Im. CONGRESS MAY ENFORCE THE FIRST AMENDMENT AGAINST
STATE COURTS BY PROVIDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO ECCLESIASTIC
DEFENDANTS UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Section 5 Power of the Fourteenth Amendment
In City of Boerne v. Mores,29 the United States Supreme Court
unequivocally stated that Congress may enforce the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment against the states using the Section 5
enforcement power. ' 30 Congress has broad discretion and latitude in
deciding when and where its enforcement power is required .
126. Id.; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (noting that while liability
for negligent torts cannot be imposed without delving excessively into religious doctrine,
policy, and practice, intentional torts can be); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997)
(noting that under the same reasoning, courts have refused to recognize torts in other causes
of action. As for negligent infliction of emotional distress, to determine whether the diocese's
responses to its member's claims were "reasonable" would require a judge to rule on the
reasonableness standards of religious beliefs, discipline and government, and offends the First
Amendment.).
127. See supra Part lI.C3.a-b.
128. Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190,191 (1960) (per curiam).
129. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
130. Id. at 519.
131. See id. at 520 (noting that "Congress must have wide latitude in determining where
[an unconstitutional action] lies").
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However, the power is not plenary, and the Court has recognized
several limitations on the employment of the Section 5 power.
In Flores, the Court held that the Section 5 power allows Congress to
enforce constitutional rights only as they have been interpreted by the
Court, and that the Section 5 power does not allow Congress to enhance
or change the nature of constitutional rights.32 In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,3 the
Court held that the remedy provided by Congress under the Section 5
enforcement power must be closely tailored to, and proportional to, the
constitutional evil it is designed to prevent. In College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,35 the Court
emphasized that valid use of the Section 5 power must be directed at the
remediation or prevention of constitutional violations that could
arguably be recognized by that body.'36 Most recently, in United States v.
Morrison,"7 the Court affirmed that the Section 5 power may only be
used against the states and may not be employed against mere private
conduct.38
1. Limits on Enforcement Rights under Section 5: Flores and RFRA
As discussed in Part II of this Comment, the United States Supreme
Court fundamentally altered the standard for First Amendment
protections of the free exercise of religion in the landmark decision
Employment Division v. Smith.39 Prior to Smith, when confronted with
a governmental regulation that substantially burdened a religious
practice, the Court required the showing of a compelling government
interest before the regulation would be deemed not to have violated the
First Amendment."40 In Smith, the Court dropped its requirement that
the government show a compelling interest and held that religious
practices could be regulated by the government under "neutral,
generally applicable law."141
In response to Smith, religious adherents and their representatives in
132. Id. at 519, 520.
133. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
134. Id. at 645-46.
135. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
136. Id. at 675.
137. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
138. Id. at 625-26.
139. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
140. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
141. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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Congress clamored to restore the religious protections lost in that
decision.42 In 1993, Congress enacted, and the President signed, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act43 (RFRA) requiring federal and
state governmental bodies to refrain from enacting laws of general
applicability that would restrict the free exercise of religion, unless the
government could show a compelling interest, thereby legislatively
restoring the pre-Smith constitutional standard.'
44
In Flores, a local bishop applied for a permit from a local zoning
board to expand the size of a church in his diocese.45 The zoning board,
citing a historical landmark ordinance, denied the petition. 46 The
bishop commenced a lawsuit to obtain relief from the denial of his
permit on the basis that, under RFRA, the local zoning board could not
deny his petition, absent a compelling government interest for doing
SO. 1
47
The Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states, holding that
Congress did not have the authority to change the substantive rights of
the First Amendment under the Section 5 power.1" The Court reasoned
that while the Section 5 power could be employed to enforce First
Amendment rights as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Smith, an
attempt to restore the "compelling interest" standard afforded by the
pre-Smith doctrines was not within Congress's Section 5 authority. '49
Therefore, the zoning ordinance, as a neutral law of general
applicability, did not unconstitutionally prohibit the free exercise of
religion under the Smith-standard, and Congress could not enact
legislation to make such conduct by the zoning board unconstitutional."
Flores was a reminder to Congress of the limit on its abilities to
legislate under Section 5. The Section 5 power may not be used to
"alterf the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause" or to "chang[e] what
the right is.""' When seeking to enforce the Free Exercise Clause under
Section 5, therefore, Congress must abide by the Court's interpretation
142. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (struck down by the Court as
unconstitutional in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -3(a).









of what rights the First Amendment affords to religion.
2. Proportionality of Enforcement Remedy under Section 5: College
Savings 152 and the amended Patent Remedy Act
College Savings I concerned the constitutionality of certain
provisions in the amended Patent Remedy Act.' Congress amended
the Patent Remedy Act to expressly abrogate state sovereign immunity
for patent infringement claims brought by citizens of that state.'s' Using
its Section 5 power, Congress intended to enforce the protections of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting states
from denying patent holders their rights to just compensation for use of
the patents.'5
The Court held that the amended Patent Remedy Act could not be
enforced against states because Congress did not closely tailor the Act
to respond to actual instances of state patent infringements that
violated, or arguably violated, the Constitution.'56 The Court held that
the legislative means used by Congress to prevent or remedy
unconstitutional injuries must be congruent and proportional to the evils
confronted.' 5 In its legislative report, Congress cited only a "handful"
of patent infringement instances that Congress thought were
unconstitutional, yet the Court reasoned that the actual legislative Act
was "'so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that [it could not] be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.""" Given the isolated nature of the
patent violations cited in the legislative record, Congress was required
to limit the scope of the coverage to address particular instances of
constitutional violations.
152. The author recognizes the similarity of names between Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S.
666 (1999). To avoid confusion, the author refers to these cases as College Savings I and
College Savings II, respectively.
153. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
154. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a).
155. Id.
156. College Savings I, 527 U.S. at 645-46.
157. Id. at 639.
158. Id. at 645-46 (citations omitted).
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3. Enforcement of Constitutional Protections under Section 5: College
Savings 11 and the TRCA
Under the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA),"9
Congress authorized individuals to sue states in federal court under
Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946160 for advertising in a false or
misleading manner. Under the Section 5 power, Congress attempted to
abrogate state sovereign immunity from suit under TRCA to prevent
deprivation of two property interests: (1) the right to be free from false
advertising, and (2) the right of security in one's business interests.161
The Court rejected the TRCA provisions abrogating state sovereign
immunity from suit and held that federal courts had no jurisdiction to
entertain suits under the Act because neither of the two property
interests cited by Congress were protected under the Due Process
Clause.62
The Court stated that any legislation enacted under the Section 5
power must have the object of preventing or remedying constitutional
violations." The right to freedom from false advertising and the right of
business security were not recognized property rights protected by the
Constitution 64 In absence of a recognized or colorable constitutional
violation, the Court held that Congress did not have the authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity -under the Section 5 enforcement
power. "
4. Requirements that Section 5 Power be Limited to States or State
Actors: Morrison and VAWA.
In United States v. Morrison,"' the Supreme Court addressed
whether Congress had the authority to pass the Violence Against
Women Act" (VAWA), which was enacted under the Section 5 power
to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.'6 In a lengthy legislative record, Congress cited empirical
159. 106 STAT. § 3567 (1999).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1122(b)-(c).




166. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
168. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
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data indicating that violence against women was being under-deterred
by state court systems due to court biases against victims of gender-
motivated violence, and Congress concluded that such widespread
under-deterrence was a denial of the equal protection of the laws."9
Under VAWA, victims of gender-motivated injuries were allowed to
seek civil remedies against their aggressors in federal court.'
The Court struck down VAWA, emphasizing that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to state actions.171 By providing for a cause of
action against private individuals, Congress's use of the Section 5
enforcement power was invalid. 2 The Court stated that VAWA was
not aimed at conduct by states or state actors who fail to administer
equal protection of the laws;' rather, the Act attempted to prevent
private conduct by individuals who commit gender-motivated crimes."
5. The Proposed Statute
To halt the unconstitutional adjudication of religious torts, Congress
should authorize religious defendants to sue for injunctive relief as a
prophylactic measure to prevent state courts from unconstitutionally
adjudicating religious torts.75 The statute might read:
I. TITLE-This Act shall be known as the "Recognition of
Religious Freedom Act."
II. PURPOSE-This statute is enacted under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and is
intended to enforce all rights existing under the first two religious
clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution.
III. JUDICIAL RELIEF
(A) TEMPORARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF-A defendant
to a civil action in state court may seek and secure temporary
injunctive relief in the federal district court residing in the state
where the cause of action is filed to prevent a state court from
violating the first or second religious clauses of the First
169. Id. at 631-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A)-(B), (e)(3) (1994).
171. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-27.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 621.
174. Id.
175. Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
670 (1999) (stating that "Congress may authorize a suit [against a state] in the exercise of its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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Amendment to the Constitution where the defendant is able to
produce prima facie evidence to support a claim that a violation
to either of the religious clauses will occur if a state court
continues to adjudicate the matter.
(B) PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF-If temporary
injunctive relief is granted to the defendant in subsection (A),
the defendant may seek and secure permanent injunctive relief
from a federal district court and the court shall permanently
enjoin the state court from adjudicating the claim unless the state
court proves by clear and convincing evidence that adjudication
of the claim will not violate the religious clauses of the First
Amendment to the Constitution.
IV. ATrORNEY'S FEES-Section 722(b) of the Revised
Statutes (42 U.S.C. § 1888(b)) is amended.
V. BROAD CONSTRUCTION-This Act shall be liberally
construed in favor of a broad religious protection, and a court
shall interpret this statute to provide religious protection to the
maximum extent permitted by the Constitution.
VI. DEFINITIONS-In this Act:
(A) DEFENDANT-The term "defendant" means any
person against whom a cause of action is filed in state court.
(B) STATE COURT-The term "state court" means a court
authorized to adjudicate any matter by the constitution, statute,
or ordinance of any State.
B. Congress May Validly Enact the Proposed Statute Under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment
1. The Threshold Requirements for Valid Employment of Section 5
Power are Satisfied
Before Congress can validly enact a statute under its Section 5
power, it must demonstrate that it has the power to do so. Namely, it
must demonstrate that the statute enforces existing constitutional rights,
is proportional to the evil confronted, remedies arguable constitutional
violations, and is aimed at state actors.176 The proposed statute meets all
four of these requirements.
2. The Statute Enforces Existing Constitutional Rights
Under Flores, the United States Supreme Court held that Congress
176. See supra Part fII.A.
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may validly enforce the First Amendment rights as interpreted by the
Court." The proposed statute would do exactly that. The statute does
not attempt to change the substantive rights of the First Amendment;
rather, the statute merely prevents state courts from violating the
substantive rights of the First Amendment as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.
3. The Statute is Proportional to the Evil Confronted
In College Savings I, the Court held that Congress's enactment
under the Section 5 power must be congruent and proportional to the
evils it confronts.17 The injunctive relief in this proposed act lets
Congress provide a proportionate remedy for religious defendants who
may face an unconstitutional adjudication of a tort against them.
A. There is a Need for Injunctive Relief before a State Court Enters a
Final Judgment Against a Religious Defendant
Given the demands of federalism, injunctive relief is necessary to
prevent state courts from adjudicating torts unconstitutionally. Without
the right to enjoin a state court from proceeding to adjudicate a
potentially unconstitutional matter, the right to challenge the
unconstitutionality in federal court may be permanently lost. Under the
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine,179 injunctive relief may only be
employed while a state court case is pending; therefore, once
adjudicated by a state court, getting a case into federal court is a
daunting, if not impossible, undertaking. If a state court issues a final
judgment holding an ecclesiastic defendant liable, the constitutional
violation cannot be heard until the defendant appeals to the highest
court where a decision may be issued.1 O Even assuming that the case
goes through the lengthy state court appellate process, the United States
Supreme Court must still grant certiorari8. before the case may be heard
in a federal forum, and presently, the Supreme Court has declined to
177. 521 U.S. 507,518-19 (1997).
178. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639 (1999).
179. Johnson v. De Grady, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (discussing the
"Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine, under which a party losing in state court is barred
from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United
States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates
the loser's federal rights").
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a) (1994).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
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grant certiorari petitions for these types of cases.1m Given these legal
realities, the chance that an unconstitutional adjudication of a religious
tort would be reviewed by a federal court is slim. The unwillingness of
the United States Supreme Court to even review these types of cases
merely adds to the difficulty.
By providing federal injunctive relief at the onset of a state judicial
proceeding, Congress would be enacting a preventive measure designed
to ensure that potentially unconstitutional cases are actually reviewed
by federal courts. Such an enactment is proportional to the present evil
of unconstitutional decisions never seeing the light of a federal
courtroom due to the arduous nature of the judicial appellate process.
B. Injunctive Relief Does Not Unduly Hinder State Court Adjudicatory
Processes
The proposed statute does not infringe upon a state court's ability to
adjudicate matters before it. The statute merely provides that a federal
court look at the case in the event that the First Amendment might be
violated. Therefore, permanently enjoining a proceeding under these
circumstances would not unduly impact state prerogatives because in
the event a potential adjudication would be deemed in violation of the
First Amendment, the state court would never have had the
constitutional authority to hear the matter in the first place.
While inconvenience to a state adjudication process may occur in
some circumstances under the proposed statute, such minor efficiency
losses in state courts are at least proportional to the need to eradicate
state court decisions that violate the First Amendment. Thus, in an
effort to enforce the First Amendment, Section 5 unquestionably grants
Congress the power to provide for such injunctive relief against state
courts to guarantee religious freedoms.
C. The Different Levels of Injunctive Relief are Based on Evidentiary
Weight
The granting of a temporary injunction prior to issuing a permanent
injunction demonstrates that the statute is proportional to the harm
Congress is trying to prevent. Temporary relief is a proportional
remedy to the evil confronted because it allows a claimant to
immediately halt a judicial proceeding only where there is a prima facie
182. See Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert denied, 511 U.S. 1137




showing that it may violate the First Amendment. Further, the stay of
the judicial proceeding is for only as long as necessary for a federal court
to examine the constitutional issue involved. Thus, the type of
injunctive relief provided in the statute directly corresponds with the
weight of evidence a religious defendant is able to produce before a
federal court showing that a particular proceeding is being conducted in
violation of the First Amendment. Under this statutory arrangement,
therefore, federal injunctive relief is granted only when sufficient
evidence, at two different stages, is brought by the parties to show
whether the state adjudication is unconstitutional.
Permanent injunctive relief would be rightfully granted by a federal
court when a claimant produces evidence to show that the continuation
of the proceeding would violate the Constitution. Given that the issue
before the court is the First Amendment, the state court should bear the
burden of clearly demonstrating that it is able to proceed with the
adjudication of the matter without violating the First Amendment. If
the state is able to meet its burden, then the proceeding should rightfully
continue. If it cannot meet its burden, the proceeding should
permanently end.
D. The Award of Reasonable Attorney's Fees is a Remedy in Proportion
to the Result Congress is Trying to Achieve
An award of reasonable attorney's fees to a successful claimant
under the proposed statute is necessary for Congress to reach its goal of
preventing state court adjudications against religious defendants that
violate the First Amendment. Under the proposed statute, civil
litigants, not the government, are responsible for the enforcement of the
First Amendment against the states. In some instances, the legal
expenses associated with litigating these types of actions could be
substantial. Thus, as part of its Section 5 prophylactic action, Congress
may provide for statutory incentives to litigants to protect their First
Amendment rights.
The fee-shifting provision works to deter state court actions that
violate the First Amendment in two ways. First, fee-shifting statutes
assist Congress with enforcement of the First Amendment by
encouraging private individuals to challenge state actions when their
constitutional rights are violated.'83  Second, fee-shifting statutes
183. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(stating that " [c]ongress intended the fee-shifting statutes to serve as an integral enforcement
mechanism in a variety of federal statutes-most notably, civil rights and environmental
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encourage competent counsel to represent claimants, thereby assuring
that sound and thorough litigation results when a claimant seeks
protection under the statute." Thus, working in concert, the fee-shifting
incentives assist Congress with achieving its First Amendment
enforcement goals.
4. The Statute Remedies Colorable Constitutional Violations
In College Savings II, the Court held that Congress has authority to
enact Section 5 prophylactic measures to remedy recognizable or
colorable constitutional violations.' Witnessed by the stark difference
in judicial opinions as to the First Amendment protections from
adjudication of religious torts, Congress is entitled to conclude that
constitutional violations are occurring at the state level.
When some state courts declare that a cause of action for breach of a
fiduciary duty by a clergy member violates the First Amendment, and
other courts hold that such a cause of action is allowed under the First
Amendment, Congress can only rationally assume that half of the
opinions are correct, and that the other half misinterpret the First
Amendment. Thus, by enacting the proposed statute, Congress is acting
with the intent to remedy these constitutional violations as required by
the Court in College I.
5. The Statute is Aimed at State Actors
In Morrison, the Court made it clear that the Section 5 power is only
validly employed against state actors."6 The proposed statute meets this
requirement because it is only directed against the actions of state
courts.
IV. POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DIFFICULTIES
WITH PROVIDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE SECTION 5
ENFORCEMENT POWER
In addition to having the authority to enact the proposed statute
under its Section 5 power, Congress must also show that the proposed
statutes").
184. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-80 (1986) (stating that Congress
enacted fee-shifting statutes to ensure that competent counsel will be attracted to suits that
without the fee-shifting statute would not be economically feasible for competent counsel to
take).
185. CoIL Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
672 (1999).
186. 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000).
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statute does not violate other provisions of the Constitution or other
legislative enactments. Specifically, this section will discuss how the
proposed statute comports with state immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, the Anti-Injunction Act, and the Younger
Abstention Doctrine.
A. State Immunity from Suit under the Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution" has been broadly
interpreted to prevent federal court suits by citizens against states on
claims concerning federal law.'88 Generally, Congress cannot abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment protection of sovereign immunity from
suit by citizens of its own or foreign states in cases raising federal
questions. However, there are exceptions to this broad interpretation.
Congress, under the Section 5 power, can abrogate Eleventh
Amendment state sovereign immunity89 and authorize injunctions
against state officials acting in violation of federal law.'O
In Ex Parte Young,' the Court held that when state officials act in a
manner that violates the Constitution, they are "stripped of ... official
or representative character" and no longer act in a sovereign capacity."9
The case involved the question of whether the Attorney General of the
State of Minnesota could be enjoined from enforcing a law that was
declared unconstitutional. The Court held that if the Attorney General
enforced the statute, it would be an action outside of the rightful
authority of the state, and therefore vulnerable to federal injunctive
action.93 Thus, if a state court attempts to unconstitutionally adjudicate
a tort against a religious institution, the court ceases to act with
legitimate authority as a state institution, and it may be validly enjoined
by a federal court in order to prevent a violation to the First
Amendment.94
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,9' the Supreme Court held that when
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
188. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
189. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
190. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
191. 209 U.S. 123.
192. Id. at 160.
193. Id.
194. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION § 7.5.1 (3d ed. 1999).
195. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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Congress passes a statute pursuant to its power to enforce the post-Civil
War Amendments,.. and gives a citizen the right to sue a state in federal
court, the statute abrogates the Eleventh Amendment. This principle
was recently restated in Seminole Tribe v. Florida1 7 Therefore, if the
proposed statute is validly enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Section 5 power, it abrogates the Eleventh Amendment and allows a
citizen to petition the federal courts to enjoin a state court from
unconstitutionally adjudicating a religious tort.
B. Anti-Injunction Act
Under the Anti-Injunction Act,' Congress may authorize or
prohibit federal courts to stay proceedings in state courts."' While the
purpose of the Act is to minimize federal interference with state judicial
proceedings,2w Congress may authorize the staying of judicial
proceedings in fundamental areas of national public policy such as
bankruptcy and tax law.20' Therefore, under the proposed statute,
Congress may expressly authorize a federal court to enjoin a state court
when there is a prima facie showing that the adjudication of a religious
tort violates the First Amendment.
C. The Younger Abstention Doctrine
In Younger v. Harris,7 the United States Supreme Court held that
absent exceptional circumstances, federal courts should not interfere
with state criminal or quasi-criminal disciplinary actions. 20 Because the
196. The post-Civil War amendments are the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
197. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994) ("A court of the United States may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.").
199. Id.
200. See W. Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating "[t]he Act
reflects fundamental principles of equity, comity, and federalism which normally counsel
against federal interference with state judicial proceedings").
201. Bankruptcy courts, for example, have power to restrain state court proceedings.
See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000) (providing for stay of a bankruptcy suit until adjudication of
petitions); 11 U.S.C. § 362 (providing for stay to enforce tax liens); 11 U.S.C. § 921 (1994)
(allowing a state court proceeding to resume after removal of the case to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (1994)).
202. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
203. Id. at 56 (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that federal courts "must not, save in
exceptional and extremely limited circumstances, intervene by way of either injunction or
declaration in an existing state criminal prosecution").
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proposed statute does not address criminal or quasi-criminal
administrative proceedings, the doctrine does not prevent Congress
from providing for injunctive relief in this instance.2 Further, the
Younger Abstention Doctrine is a judge-made doctrine25 designed to
impose self-restraint on the federal judiciary to preserve the federalism
balance between the federal government and the states.2 As judge-
made doctrine, Congress, under its Section 5 power, is able to override
the Younger Abstention Doctrine by providing express authorization
for federal injunctive relief.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Section 5 enforcement power of the Fourteenth
Amendment may be employed by Congress to guarantee religious
freedoms to ecclesiastic defendants in state courts. As a fundamental
principle of constitutional law, the protections of the religious clauses of
the First Amendment should be uniformly enforced in state as well as
federal courts. However, state courts are not uniformly interpreting the
First Amendment as it applies to religious defendants when adjudicating
torts.2 This disparity of interpretation and application of constitutional
law raises colorable questions as to the constitutionality of state court
tort adjudications on the whole as they apply to religious defendants.
Congress, under the Section 5 power, is entitled to assume that
constitutional violations are therefore occurring in the state courts and
may enact legislation to remedy such violations.
By providing injunctive relief to ecclesiastic defendants who might
otherwise suffer unconstitutional tort adjudications by state courts,
Congress counteracts colorable constitutional violations by issuing a
statutory remedy that is both proportional and closely tailored to the
evil confronted. The relief provided by the statute proposed in this
Comment is proportional because it does not deny a state court the right
to proceed with an adjudication unless evidence can be shown that the
action would violate the Constitution. Further, the statute would not
204. Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975) (limiting the Younger Abstention
doctrine to criminal proceedings and those "akin to ... criminal prosecution[s]").
205. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 194, § 13.1.
206. Huffinan, 420 U.S. at 601 (recognizing that that United States are "made up of...
separate state governments, and.., that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions... " ) .
207. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding that where Congress has provided
express authorization to do so, federal courts may enjoin state court proceedings).
208. See supra Part II.C.3.a-b.
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permanently bar a state court from proceeding without conducting a full
hearing on the merits and after a prima facie case is made that the
proceeding would violate the First Amendment. Even though such
procedural checks may inconvenience the state courts, such burdens are
clearly outweighed by the need to halt unconstitutional adjudications
arguably occurring in the state judicial arena.
History chronicles the struggle of the American people to secure
religious freedom.2 From the first landing of religious travelers on the
shores of the Eastern seaboard,21 1 to the enactment of the First
Amendment by the young American Republic,21  and the eventual
application of the First Amendment to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment,21 2 the freedom from government entanglement
in religious affairs has been an integral part of the American
experiment. The legacy of these struggles should remind each
209. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 148 (1967) (noting that "[iun [the
United States] . . . the struggle for religious liberty was a facet of the struggle for
disestablishment" and the struggle continued "until separation [of church and state] was
achieved.").
210. Id. at 71 (noting that early colonialists to the New World were "religious laymen ...
who fled to the wilderness to find a haven where they might practice their own version of
Christianity").
211. ROBERT S. ALLEY, JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 219-20 (1985)
(noting that the First Amendment was adopted as a result of demands from Americans and
the colonial states that the United States Constitution contain a provision that would
guarantee "religious freedom and freedom from taxation for the support of religion." In
response to these demands, the First Amendment was ultimately ratified on December 15,
1791.).
212. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 115 (2000) (noting that the "[i]ncorporation doctrine was a small part of an
emerging constitutional nationalism that insisted on the guarantees of fundamental liberty
and rule of law for all").
213. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 230 (1986).
[R]eligious liberty was more central to the nation's original moral self-definition
than is comprehended by a modern generation's routine inclusion of... 'freedom to
go to the church of your choice.'... It had a depth and centrality not comprehended
by-for example-the modern journalist for whom the phrase 'the First
Amendment' simply means an absolute grant to the press. For Madison and
Jefferson and the 'republicans' on the one hand, and for the enthusiasts, dissenters,
and sectarians on the other hand, the First Amendment, and the Bill of Rights in the
states, contained something more basic. Liberty of 'conscience,' meaning freedom
of religious belief and conviction and activity, was near the center, or at the center,
of the whole revolutionary American project.
Id. William Lee Miller further notes:
[T]hose [founding] fathers ... establish[ed] the framework of principle ... called
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American generation of the need to vigilantly preserve and uphold the
religious freedoms afforded by the First Amendment to the
Constitution. After all, the religious clauses of the First Amendment
are the supreme law, and when they are violated by state or federal
actors, reprisal should be swift. It is the position of this Comment that
unconstitutional adjudications of torts against ecclesiastic bodies are
presently occurring in courts of the several states. To remedy these
violations, Congress should employ its Section 5 power against the states
to enforce the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
RYAN G. LEE*
religious liberty, and the framework of independence of religious and civic
institutions each from the other, a framework now formed not only in constitutional
law but also... in the mind of... public-that is, in the ethos. []t is reinforced by
the groundwork of a reciprocally balancing diversity-a diversity that the tradition
[of separation of church and state] itself helped to create and that gives the principle
framework.., a realistic foundation in... the population.
Id. at 231.
* The author would like to thank Professor Scott C. Idleman for his advice and
encouragement throughout the process of writing this Comment.
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